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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
DUANE ROYLANCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
STEPHEN L. DAVIES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
CASE 
NO. 10641 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and 
Brief in Su~port T~ereof 
RESPONDENT'S PETmON FOR REHEARING 
Respondent, Duane Roylance petitions the Court for 
a rehearing in this case upon the grounds hereinafter set 
forth. 
In support of said Petition, respondent relies upon the 
following point: 
POINT 1 
TI-IE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN APPLYING THE 
STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF A MOTORIST 
TOW ARDS HIS GUEST AS IT RELATES TO UTAH'S 
2 
GUEST STATUTE, SECTION 41-9-1, UTAH COtE Ac, 
NOTATED, 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT ERRED IN LAW IN APPLYING 'D-lf 
STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF A MOTOR!~T 
TOWARDS HIS GUEST AS IT RELATES TO UTAHs 
GUEST STATUTE, SECTION 41-9-1, UTAH CODE A;;. 
NOTATED, 1953. 
This Court, in its opinion, applied the rule that our 
guest statute released the operator of an automobile from 
responsibility for injuries to a gratuitous guest lllless thi 
operator intendEd the accident to o~cur. I illustrate tit:· , 
application of the standard of care applied by quoting from . 
the opinion of Judge Ellett the following three paragraphs 
"There was no evidence that the defendant intention· i 
ally struck the cement abutment, and the only logi- : 
cal inference which could be drawn is that he just cL: ; 
not see it." 
"In the case of Cusack vs. Longak2r, (C.C.A.2d). ~: 
F.2d 304, the h03t, at night, drove by a stop sign at : 
I 
a spe2d testified to be b2twecn twenty and thirty.five 1. 
I 
miles p2·r hour and collided with an automobil2 on the ! 
favored highway. The host said he did not ~ee thr : 
stop sign, although it had red reflectors to catch the I 
rays of headlights of approaching cars. Judgment 11ZL' • 
for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Althou;' \ 
the appellate court found that the trial court Ina 
erred in favor of the defendant in giving instruction> 
to the jury, which error had caused the verdict, nevrr· 
theless, it affirmed the judgment as rendered and di(I 
3 
so upon the ground and forr the reason that the case 
should not have been submitted to the jury in the first 
place. The Court said: 
'If negligence were all that the plaintiff were 
required to prove, he undoubtedly made a case 
for the jury; but we do not think that Longaker's 
failure to see the sign and his maintenance of a 
speed of 35 miles in cro.;sing a street at 1 o'clock 
in the morning is evidence of negligence so gross 
as to justify a finding of 'wilful and wanton mis-
conduct'.' " 
"Let it be assumed that the derfendant drove his 
car into the pole and that he did not hit the concrete 
ob:=;truction in the highway. One would have to find 
that he willfully drove into the pole to make a case 
of willful misconduct." 
In the United States, approximately twenty-seven 
states have sE:2n fit to pass what is commonly known as 
the guest statute. Of all of the states which have passed 
the guest statute, only two, Kentucky and Washington, 
worded their standard of care to require an intent to cause 
the accident or injmy. For a complete list of the states 
mentioned, see The Law of Torts by Fowler V. Harper and 
Fleming James, Jr., Volume 2, page 951.- Of 1Jhe two 
states that required intent to cause the accident or injury, 
one ,statute has been repealed and the other has been de-
cl21-cd m1constitutional. Kentucky's statute was held un-
constitutional in the case of Ludwig vs. Johnson, et al, 49 
S.W.2d 347. Washington's statute was held constitu-
tional, see Shea vs. Olson, 53 P.2d 615, but was thereafter 
repealed, see Edward J. Crowley, as Administrator de bonis 
non of the Estate of Violet N. Mullen, Deceased, Appellant, 
vs. Rodney Barto and Barbara Barto h b d ' us an and 11ii, 
Respondents, 367 P.2d 828. 
This Court, if it now requires proof of an inte 1. n ion~ 
act to cause the accident itself or injury, now stan,1,, .1 
u:; cllvnt 
as to the standard of care required of a host towards J.;, 
guest when in fact, cur statute, 41-9-1, Utah Code Aruil· 
tated, 1953, does not call for said standard. 
This Court has herEtofore approved the irn;tructirJ 
which was given in the instant case as follows: 
"Willful misconduct connotes a greater wrongdoing 
mere negligence or even gross negligence. It inclur;c: 
a conscious or intentional vblation of definite law 
rule of conduct with the knowledge of the peril to t. ' 
apprehended from such act or failure to act." 
I 
If our statute and the authorities are examined tlk 1 
' ' 
intentional act referred to in the instruction approv€d iJ! ! 
the Court is not the intent to cause injury or to cause ar. ; 
accident, but is, as the approved instruction states, a m~ ! 
scious or intentional violation of definite law or rule c: i 
I 
conduct with the knowledge of the peril to be apprehendEJ ! 
from such act or failure to act. 
' 
The case of Cusack vs. Longaker is readily distiJi .. i 
guished from this case as may be illustrated by the 11') 
statement of Torts, Second, Section 500, Subsection o. \ 
which reads 1as follows: 
I 
."I 
"b. Perception of risk. Conduct cannot be '' • 
reckless disregard of the safety of oithers unless 1t1 
act or omission is itself intended, notwithstanding thj: 
the actor knows o!f facts which would lead any reaso~ 
h. l 't SU~ able man to realize the extreme risk to w ic 1 1 '. 
jects the safety of others. It is reckless for a dme: 
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0 f an automobile intentionally to cross a through high-
way in defiance of a stop sign if a stream of vehicles 
is seen to be closely approaching in both directions, 
but if his failure to stop is due to the fact that he has 
permitted his attention to be diverted so that he does 
nut know that he is approaching the crossing, he may 
bf' merely negligent and not reckless. So too, if his 
failure to stop is due to the fact that his brakes fail 
to act. he may be negligent if the bad condition of the 
brakes could have been discovered by such an inspec-
tion as it is his duty to make, but his conduct is not 
i·eckless." 
A 1960 decision from the Supreme Court of Oregon 
in the case of .June C. Burghardt, Guardian ad lltem, for 
Gary Burghardt, a minor, Respondent, vs. Richard W. Wat-
son, Defenclant, and Janet Olson, a minior by her Guardian 
ad litem, Esther Olson, Appellant, 349 P.2d 792, in a spec-
ially concurring opinion summarizes existing law as fol-
lows: 
"O'CONNELL, Justice (specially concurring). 
It is evident from our oases, including the more 
recent ones, that our interpretation of the guest stat-
ute, ORS 30.110, has not been entirely consistent. Note: 
33 Or.L.Rev. 216 (1954). Perhaps any further effort 
to clarify the matter will simply lead to further con-
fusion, but the need for a consistent application of the 
statute is so great that I venture to express my views 
in the hope that they might suggest a solution. 
To establish a stable position in the treatment of 
c.qses under the guest statute we must reach some 
m2ac;ure of agreement as to the standard of conduct 
which we conceive the statute to describe by the lang-
uage "gross negligence" and "reckless disregard of the 
right of others." One- would be naive to assume that 
6 
anythi?g more than a ro~gh guide could b2 clE:-J,"·' 
by which to test the facts m the hmt-guest cases. ·· 
if we cut a crude pattern only, and follow it tlin 1 • ' av·. 
yers and the trial judges would at least have sorneth ·, 
to guide them in dealing with this type of case Lil 
I think that a part of the solution will b2 f1Jtmd 
in a clearer statement of the problem which confront 
us in the application of the gu2st statute. Olli· si~;. 
ute, like the guest statutes in most states, is phrased L~ 
terms of categories of fault. It speaks in the langmc:e 
of degrees of negligence, i. e., "gross negligence" whi·.li. 
according to the classification from which it is bcr 
rowed, is a category of negligence greater than orcii 
nary negligence. It also speaks of "reckless" car.du;·[ 
which is sometimes regarded as a part of the nea!i. 
c 
gence classi.fication and sometimes as a sepnrate tni:, 
of foult. See State v. Wilcox, Or.1959, 337 P.2d 7~7. ' 
It is now pretty nearly universally recognized in r~- ' 
spectable legal circles that one cannot divide negligence ; 
into degrees. Negligence is negligence, whether thr ~ 
conduct invo~ves the failure to exercise great or sllght 
care, or any graduation in between, if, under the fr. 
cumstanoes there is a duty to the plaintiff. B1·oi.111, 
The Law orf Personal Property (2d ed.), p. 327; 2 HDi" i 
per and Jame3., The Law of Torts, § 16.13; Prosser 2n •. 
Torts (2d ed.), p. 147; Salmond en the Law of Torts 
1 
(11th ed.), p. 511. It is prep.er, of ccurse. to postu· 
late principles orf liability upon the basis of the ammmt 
orf care which, as a matter of policy, should be exer-
cised in varicrus circumstances. This is the W1derly· 
ing theory implied in the guest statute. 
If the statute were applied in accordance "~th iis 
language, we would be expected to draw a line in :ach 
case between ordinary and gross negligence. Sine~, 
as pointed out above, there is no such thing as gru:s 
negligence, the court cannot make the distinction sug-
7 
cc.~tecl and the> best that it can do is to translate gross 
~c>gligence to mean "great negligence" as Mr. Justice 
Lusk did in Rogers, Administrator v. Southern Pac. 
Co , 1951, 190 Or. 643, 227 P.2d 979, and attempt to 
find some practical criterion which will permit us to 
draw a line en the scale of fault where we think that 
it will carry out the plll'pose or purposes of the guest 
statute. This is what we have tried to do in our pre-
vious guest cases. Finding it impossible to make dis-
tinctions on the scale of fault at the lQIWer level, we 
Jerked higher on the scale for a more aggmvated type 
of fault which, by leaving a wide chasm between it and 
"ordinary" fault, could be more readily differentiated 
in applying the guest statute. Thus, it is seen that 
the elimination of the less serious instances of aggra-
vated fault intended to be included in the term "gross 
negligence," resulted not simply from an effort to state 
the legislative policy of the guest statute, but from the 
necessity of finding a workable test of fault. The wid-
est gulf 1and the clear::-st distinction could have been 
established by requiring the guest to prove that hls 
host intentionally injured him. Taylor v. Taug, 1943, 
17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176; Barker v. Taylor, 1938, 
196 Wash. 22, 81 P.2d 806; Carufel v. Davis, 1936, 188 
Wash. 156, 61P.2d1005; Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 
53 P.2d 615, 111 A.L.R. 998, affirmed 186 Wash. 700, 
59 P.2d 1183, 111 A.L.R. 998. 
Next lower on the scale is an area of fault which 
ha<; gone by various legal names ("wilful," "wanton," 
"reckless") and which can be generally characterized 
by th€· actor's consciousness orf risk. This area is some-
times cte2.cribed as negligence and sometimes as some-
thin<; distinct from negligence. State v. Wilcox, supra; 
Prosser on Torts (2d ed.), p. 150; 2 Harper and James, 
The Law of Torts, ~ 16.15. The feature which is 
thought to distinguish it from "ordinary" negligence 
8 
is the actor's state of mind. 2 Restatement, 'l'oit~ ; 
500, comment g; Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, G ;,, 
Cal.L. Rev. 91, 143 (1933). Here again Ian°'i"g '· 
6L" e r1n 
be fashioned to dE\~cribe gradations of fault within th· .. 
. If h · b area itse . T e mo.:;t blameworthy conduct wouid h 
that involved in a situation in which the diivcr.
1
h
0
;.,e 
having aictual knowledge of a high probability of seri: 
ous harm to his guest, intent~o:nally elects to expose the 
guest to the unreasonable risk. For convenienc:i w:, 
might describe this conduct as reckless conduct Tn,; 
I. It is frequently described as "wilful" conduct, or 
"wanton" conduct, or as "wilful and wanton" condu~t. 
2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 describes it as "reckless" 
conduct. See Note: Distinguishing Wilful Misconduct, 
Wanton Misconduct, and Negligence, 18 U.Cinc.LRev. 
319 (1949); Note: Appleman, Wilful and Wanton Con-
duct in Automobile Guest Cases, 13 Ind.L.J. 131 (19371. 
According to some adjudicated cases the language ~ 
strong enough to indicate that this is the charactet of 
the driver's fault which must be esfablishe<l ·bv th'" 
guest. Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 
229; 19·±4, 322 U.S. 713, 64 S.Ct. 1270, 88 L.Ed. 1555. 
See: Tighe v. Diamond, 1948, 149 Ohio St. 520. 80 
N.E.2d 122; 82 Ohio App. 487, 82 N.E. 2d 99: Gran· 
flaten v. Rohde, 1938, 66 S.D. 335, 283 N.W. 153. In 
some states, it would seem, this standard of conduct i: 
set as the minimum for recorvery hy the requirement 
that the guest must prove that the driver engaged in 
a continued and persist,ent course of action, sometime; 
referred to as the "persistent course of act1on test" 
Note: 37 Tex.L.Rev. 358 (1958). It should be noted 
that if the driver did nort have knowledge of the risk 
the test for- reckless conduct Type I is not met by show· 
ing that there were facts known to the driver from 
which he should realize the danger to his guest. The 
latter type of conduct may be referred to as reckl::3s 
9 
ronduct Type II. It applies an objective test of fault 
and is easier for the guest to establish than the sub-
jective test for reckless conduct Type I. 
If Type I conduct is the test of foult, the guest 
would have to produce evidence to show that he warned 
1~1e driver of the dangeT, or that the driver had actual 
knowledge from some other source that danger was 
being encountered. Perhaps no jurisdiction consis-
tently adheres to such a test, and probably all courts 
recognize that the requisite consciousness orf risk "may 
be inferred from manifestly dangerous conduct." 2 
Harpe1· ;md James, The Law of Torts, § 16.15, p. 955, 
note call 27. Turner v. Mccready, 1950, 190 Or. 28, 
222 P.2d 1010 clearly states that the inference may be 
drawn. Mr. Justice Brand said, "The element of reck-
lessness may, under some circwnstances, be infeTred 
from evidence of the driver's conduct in the light of 
conditions ;:md of what he must have known." 190 Or. 
28, 54, 222 P.2d 1010, 1021. 
It is likely that a part orf the confusion in the guest 
cases arises out of the fact that the distinction between 
the two types of reckless conduct described above is 
not kept in mind. And even if the distinction is seen, 
a variation in the application of the objective test de-
scribed in reckless conduct Type II will result if the 
court changes its attitude from time to time as to the 
amount of evidence necessary to draw the inference 
that the driver had reason to know of facts which 
would lead a reasonable man to realize the danger. It 
is posEible that this has caused some of the variation in 
the application of cur own gue:;t statute. 
It has become common pmctice to express the test 
of fault in th;s state in terms of an "I don't care atti-
tude" on the part orf the driver. This phrase has the 
viltue of expressing a legal idea in language which can 
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be understood by the jury. But I believe that 1·~s ~ • L ic,011. 
erahty encourages "passing judgment in bulk" \Crt,ln 
Judge and Jury p. 156) and, moreover its en1ph . ' ' as1c· 
on the idea of the con:;ciousness of the risk has lt·~ 1 ~ 
to overlook the other elements orf the t::~st which. ~p 
equally, if not more, important. · 
The full consciousness that a risk is to be enc0111 
tered will not result in reckless conduct if the prouJ. 
bility orf harm is slight, or if the probability is great bui 
the harm which will probably result is nat serious 
This can be illustrated by reference to the facts in 1br 
present case. 
There is no difficulty in finding that defendant : 
was conscious orf a risk when she approached the curve : 
From her previous use of the particular highway shP 
knew that the curve was there, its character and the i 
speed indicated by the highway sign as the safe speed i 
to negotiate the curve. The ingredi2nt which is lack- : 
ing is the high de1gre,e of pro:ba:bility that serious ham : 
would result. It is common knowledge that curves i 
are frequently negotiats,d £3.fsly at sp22ds which exC'..:l ! 
the indicated sps·ed pmted by the highway d2partmert. : 
We are entitled to recognize that rounding a curve at ~ 
a spe2d twenty miles in ex02ss of the indicated ~pd i 
of 45 mile3 per hour do2s not, in itself, show that thm 
is involved a high probability of serious harm. Statd 
in another way, upon the basis of such facts alone 
there is not a sufficient warning of danger to charac· 
terize the conduct as reickless. 
Had it be2Il shown in this case that the curve wa: 
sharp, or that there were defects in the highway. er 
construction equipment in the road, or other circum· 
stance3 known to the defendant which would increase 
the risk of harm, the case in all probability would pre· 
11 
sent sufficient facts to warrant submitting it to the 
jury. There were no such facts here. 
I believe that the variations in our treatment of 
the guest statute in previous cases oan be attributed 
in large measure to the use of general language in the 
test for fault (such as expressing the test in the form-
ula of an "I don't care attitude") which suggests clear-
ly enough the idea that the defendant must be con-
scious of tihe risk but conveys little more than that, 
and de-emphasizes and perhaps sometimes even re-
sults in Eliminating the other ingredients in the test 
for reckless conduct. I think that we would establish 
rnrl maintain a reasonably consistent position in the 
guest cases if we would subject each case to a test which 
recites all of the elements of reckless conduct as we 
understand that term. I would accept as the test the 
definition set out in 2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 at p. 
1293. That section reads: 
"The actor's conduct is in r~-ckless disregard 
of the safety of another if he intentionally does an 
act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to 
the other to do, knowing or having reason to know 
of facts whioh would lead a reasonable man to 
realize that the actor's conduct not only creates an 
unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but 
also involves a high degree of probability that sub-
stantial harm will result to him." 
This section has been adopted in some states in apply-
ing their guest statute. DeLoss v. Lewis, 1947, 78 Cal. 
App.2d 223, 177 P.2d 589; Espeland v. Green, 1952, 74 
S.D. 484, 54 N.W.2d 465. 
The adoption of the Restatement definition is not 
likely to give us any significantly better guidance in 
dealing with the guest cases unless we are careful in 
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each case to apply the definition with referenrt toe 1 or the elements it contains. As the comment appen:~ 
to 2 Restatement, Torts, § 500 eArplains, we are tf'stinu 
for conduct which involves "a high dem-ee of ,..1
1
, ,~ 
~ c ctn 't' 
that s2riorus harm will re.;ult from it to anyone ,~:1; 0 
is within range of its effect"; it must involve "an ea'ilv 
pero2ptible danger"; the danger perceived mu:;t be ~ 
danger of "substantial bodily hann or death"; thf' c:i;, 
cumstances must be such that "the risk so create;i i 
unreasonable"; the driver must act or fail to aet "kno11 
ing or having reason to know" of facts which wrn1ki 
lead a reasonable man to fl2alize "the highly danger. 
ous character of his conduct." 
Further, I believe that we need to guard against 
losing sight of the purpose for which we are seeking 
a definition of fault. The definition we accept is net i 
an end in itself; it is a part of the process of interpr2t. 
ing the guest statute. The question of the amount of 
care that must be exercised, or the degree of fonli 
Whioh must be found to impose liability under the ~uest 
statute cannort be decided abstractly. It mu~~t be re· 
lated in some way to the purpci:se for which the guej 
statute was enacted. Without the guest statute the 
hmt driver would b2' liable to his gue2t for injtin'CS 
arising out of ordinary negligence. The legislature de-
cided that a different policy is applicable when an au-
tomobile guest sues his host. 
It is generally recognized that this type of statute 
was intended to "scotch' 'the proverbial ingratitude of 
the dog that bites the hand tha:t feeds him' and to put 
a barrier in the way of vexatious litigation." 2 Harper 
and James, The Law of Torts, p. 961. The statut~ 
leaves to the judicial system the task of administering 
this poJicy as each case is p~esented and the decision 
as to whether particular conduct is or is not reckle-:s 
13 
must be made with reference to that policy. lt is pos-
sible that a part of the lack of cohesion in the guest 
t:ases results from the failure to anchor the definitions 
of gross negligence, reckless conduct and similar terms 
to the statutory purpose and in the failure to judge 
the driver's case with this legislative policy as a guide. 
WhateV?r test we apply, there will always be the 
problem of ke2ping our function distinct from that of 
the jury. Our sole task is to determine whether there 
are sufficiE:nt facts in the particular case before us from 
which the jwy can reasonably find that the accident 
was caused by defendant's reckless conduct. The 
temptation here is to leave to the jury the difficult 
task of drawing a line between ordinary misconduct 
and reckless conduct. SEe Rinl:evich v. Coeling, 1955, 
344 Mich. 493, 74 N.W.2d 12, noted in 34 U.Det.L.J. 
169 (1956). But we are charged with the duty of 
interpreting the guest statute and of establishing what 
we conceive to be the minimum amount of fault which 
can still characterize the conduct as reckless within 
th meaning of the statute. In setting that minimum 
we must not read into the statute our own view of the 
policy which should govern host-guest litigation or au-
tomobile litigation generally; we must attempt to find 
the legislative objectives which pro:npted the legislation. 
No sharply defined legislative policy can be discerned, 
hut the strong language of fault in the statute and our 
understanding of the setting in 'vhich host-guest leg-
islation was drafted gives us a fair intuition with which 
to work. But cf., Burrell, A New Ap1Jroa.ch to the 
Problem of Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 1949 In. 
Law.J. 716. 
With the shift in ideas oif the basis for liability 
from fault to comp2nsation which seems to be preva-
lent, not only in the jury room but in respectable legal 
14 
circles as well, the application of the statute i11 thP 
terms of its original purpme serves to accentuaiu ti· 
\.I._. }0 
difference in treatment between the automobile vu"' t. 
0 ,s 
and others in the adjudication of their respective cl,:;n
1
; 
Green, Traffic Victims, Tort Law and Insur;:mcc w •. 
) l' .... ,. 
sim; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts, passim· 
Note: 35 Dicta 179 (1958). Perhaps the time hus eorr:'. 
when the jury should b2 permitted to treat au1 omoL!k 
guests in the same manner as it treats other injured 
plaintiffs; but that change must come from the legis-
lature, not from us." 
Harper and Jamm, in their Law of Torts, Volume 2, 
1956, beginning at page 950, dis.cus3 the problem as follows 
"§16.15. Care required of a motorist toward hLs 
guest. In a leading case the Massachus2tts court ap. 
plied the analogy of the gratuitous bailmerrt to the 
situation where a social gue3t in an automobile su:d 
the owner for injuries caused by the negligence of th1 
driver. It was held that there could be recovery onlJ 
upon a showing of gro2s negligence on the part of the 
defendant. Mmt courts refused to follow this lead ancl 
the common law rule today in the absence of statute 
is that the owner of an automobile owe:; a guest th~ 
duty orf ordinary care so far as the operation of th 
car is concerned. The legislatures in many states. 
however, enacted (in the late '20s and the '30s) so. 
called guest statutes which relaxed the standard of 
care required of an automobile owner towards his gra· 
tuitoos passenger. These are not tmiform in their 
language. The Washington statute requires inien· 
tional misconduct, those of California and Utah "intox· 
ication or wilful misconduct." Some statutes make 
liability depend on whether misconduct ha:s bf>en "wan· 
ton" or "willful"; orthers specify "heedlessness and rec~· 
less disregard" of the rights of others. Still other 2.cis 
15 
use the term "gross negligence," and some employ a 
combination of the foregoing. It remains to analyze 
the main types of requirements and to see what prac-
tical effects these statutes, and the differences among 
them, have. 
Disagreement and confusion have marked judi-
cial attempts to define these terms, even within a 
single jurisdiction. Often they add nothing helpful to 
the language of the statute itself. The problem of put-
ting a rule into words is even greater if states with 
similar statutes 'are taken together. Thus while the 
meaning of "intentional" misconduct in the Washing-
ton statute is fairly clear, there has been little uni-
formity in interpreting the oft-used "willful miscon-
duct." A few courts equate the term with "gross neg-
ligence," but a larger number distinguish the two con-
cepts and emp1~1asize subjective factors like "intent," 
"consciousnsss," or "knowledge," in discussing willful-
ness. Similar conflict marks the interpretation of 
"gross negligence." Scme courts regard it as simply a 
greater degree of negligence, differing from it only in 
quantity. Others think the differenoe is so great as 
to be one of kind, and such courts tend to assimilate 
"gross negligence" to "willful misconduct." "Heed-
lessness or re~kless mis.conduct" has been treated as 
"gross negligence" on the one hand, and as "wanton 
misconduct" on the other. All courts agree, however, 
that the guest statutes require something more than 
crdinary negligence, and most will describe the differ-
ence as one of kind or quality rather than of quantity 
merely. 
Out of this welter of words two practical prob-
lems emerge: What l{ind of a showing will he required 
before a jury is allowed to find liability undeT a guest 
statute? And what will be proper language for a 
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charge to the jury? Underlying both these prohle , 
is the question whether willful misconduct (or w DJ.. an. 
tonness or recklessness) is to be tested by an objectivt> 
or by a subjective standard. We have already exam 
ined a similar problem with regard to ordinary negli. 
gence and have seen how the test there is largely coJJ. 
cerned with external conduct and not with the stirc· 
of mind of the actor, even though much of the Jang: 
uage used ( " " ... d rt " " i· · e. g., care, ma ve ence, neg igenc2" 1 
suggests a state of mind analysis. In rthe present field 
the language is even more strongly suggestive of the 
courts' concern with mental states and attitudes, and 
judicial analysis is much more confusing. The question~ 
are: (1) Must the host have had any particular state 
of mind before a jury may find his conduct willful or 
wanton? (2) If the host in fact had a state of mind 
characterized by an utter disregard of injurious con-
sequences, may a jury consider that fact in deciding 
the issue of willfulness or wantonness? 
It is submitted that no particular state of millci 
should be required for a finding of wanton or wiJlfuj 
misconduct. If defendant's conduct, in the light of 
circumstances which he knew or should have known. 
involved a high degree of manife3t danger, that should 
be enough withcut regard to defendant's mental atti· 
tude. Thus if the driver of a trailer truck undertakes 
to pass another trailer truck as they both near the 
brow of a hm on a tw~lane highway, it should make 
no difference at all whether the mind of the overtak 
ing driver was filled with anxious solicitude for his 
fellow travelers or with an utter indifference to the 
probable danger to them. 
Most actual decisions simply do not come to grips 
with this problem. All agree that a wanton state 0f 
mind may be inf erred from manifestly dangerous con 
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duct. Almost no cases face the question of what the 
jury should do if they do ncrt in fact draw that infer-
ence - if they find instead that defendant acted dan-
gerously enough but with well-meaning stupidity. A 
single California decision would let the jury exhorner-
ate the driver, but there was a strong dissent and the 
Restatement of Torts supports the position taken here. 
A further and different question is whether the 
exisitence of a willful or wanton state of mind may be 
oonsidered in determining the issue of liability under 
a guest statute. We submit that it should be. Many 
cases involve conduct which is negligent, yet not so 
dangerous - objectively considered - as that of the 
truck driver just described. If it can be shown, how-
ever, that the actor was engaging in that conduct with 
an attitude of utter disregard of consequences, then 
the conduct assumes a more menacing aspect. For 
one thing its dangerous tendencies are less likely to 
be controlled or counteracted if a crisis arises. Courts 
quite rightly, therefore, regard state of mind as a fac-
tor to be considered in these cases, though it should 
not be a requirement (indispensable to lia:bilirty). 
If the foregoing analysis is accepted, then a jury 
should be told they may find the host's conduct wan-
ton or willful if they find that he knew or should have 
known of circumstances which would cause a reason-
able man to recognize that rtlhe conduct created a high 
degree of probability that danger to the guest would 
result, or if they find the conduct unreasonably dan-
gerous and accompanied by an utter disregard of pos-
sible dangerous consequences. Thus an actor's state 
of mind might turn negligent conduct into wantonness. 
When we come to consider the kind of showing 
which courts will regard as sufficient to warrant a find-
ing of liability under guest statutes, there is far greater 
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uniformity than there is as to theory or proper 1 
uage for instructions. It is generally agreed, for<Ulg. 
ample, that a :ombination of negligent acts may ~~ 
up to a conclus10n that the actor was engaged in Willful 
misconduct. On the other hand, seldom Will a sing! 
type of negligent act alone, such as exce:;sive S{Yeede 
driving en tJhe wrong side cf the mad, or falling asleep' 
make the host liable in the abseno~ of otheT circum: 
stances which point to a dispoi:;ition toward reckle&1 
behavior. Often the courts give substantial weight 
as a factor in proving willful misconduct, to eviden~ 
of a verbal exchange between the host and guest over 
the former's manner of driving. If the guest has pro-
tested, the host's reaction to the protest may often shed 
light on his attitude of mind. Yet the guest's prot.eJ1E 
will not make the host's acts willful misconduct wh~ 
no serious deviations from ordinary driving are shown." 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that the Court ernd 
in reaching the conclusions that it did reach. Under the 
Court's ruling, Utah will rEpresent a view that is not shared 
by any other Court in the United States, and will have, by 
judicial decision, placed an interpretation up::m willful mJs. 
conduct contrary to that of any other court in the United 
State;; with a similar statute, and creiate a different stan~ 
ard of care in guest cases than what has heretofore bt>eI 
the law of the State of Utah. This case changes the law of 
the State of Utah. 'This case should be re-argued and 1!le 
the judgment of the District Cburt affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY H. IVIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff and A~ 
